Software Based Side Channel Attacks And Defenses In Restricted Environments. Our page table defenses restrict the OS kernels ability to read and write page table pages and defend against page allocation attacks and our LLC defenses utilize the Intel Cache Allocation Technology along with. System-level approaches eg isolating the source of side channels for a program are not applicable because the OS is untrusted.
Evaluating Experiences of Autistic Children with Technologies in Co-Design 18 Katta Spiel TU Wien. I obtained my PhD with the title Software-based Side-Channel Attacks and Defenses in Restricted Environments in 2019 from Graz University of Technology advised by Daniel Gruss. Known defenses have major limitations as they require either error-prone developer assistance incur extremely high runtime overhead or prevent only specific attacks.
I hold two masters degrees one in computer science and.
Before Meltdown and Spectre micro-architectural side channel attacks were generally targeting the behavior of the cache in isolation. In a common attack the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. In recent years there was an increase in the number of publications about micro-architectural side channel attacks. We investigate known and new side channels and show that microarchitectural attacks can be fully automated.